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Hubbard as Hero

I do not hesitate to recommend him without reserve as a man of intelligence, courage and good breeding as well as one of the most versatile personalities I have ever known.

- JIMMY BRITTON, president KGBU Radio Alaska, of Hubbard in 1941

He is garrulous and tries to give impressions of his importance . . .

- U.S. NAVAL ATTACHÉ FOR AUSTRALIA, writing of Hubbard in 1942

Hubbard's claims about his Navy career form a major part of the Superman image he tried to project. He and his followers have claimed he saw action in the Philippines upon the U.S. entry into World War II. Hubbard was supposedly the first returned casualty from the "Far East," and was dispatched immediately to the command of an antisubmarine warfare vessel which served in the North Atlantic. He allegedly rose to command the "Fourth British Corvette" squadron, and then saw service with amphibious forces in the Pacific, ending the War in Oak Knoll Naval Hospital, "crippled and blinded," the recipient of between twenty-one and twenty-seven medals and palms. His exploits were, Hubbard claimed, the basis for a Hollywood movie starring Henry Fonda. As ever, there are inconsistencies between Hubbard's own accounts.

Hubbard also referred to his time in Naval Intelligence, and much is made of this experience by Scientologists. On his U.S. Navy Reserve commission papers, issued in July, 1941, he was designated a volunteer for "Special Service (Intelligence duties)," an assignment he requested. His service record shows that when he was eventually called to permanent active duty in November, he was indeed posted as an "intelligence officer." The expression conjures up cloak and dagger images better associated with the CIA's forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services, which did not exist at that time. Although the U.S. was not yet at war, France had fallen and the Japanese threat was recognized. The U.S. Navy was on a major recruiting drive when Hubbard was commissioned. The duties of intelligence officers at that time were largely routine, including the censorship of letters, and the collection, compilation and distribution of information. Hubbard nominally served in this capacity for five months, spending much of that time either in transit or in training.

After receiving his Naval Reserve commission, Hubbard was not immediately called to active duty. By this time he was employed as a civilian by the Navy in New York City, working with public relations and recruiting. He was only on active duty for two weeks between his commissioning in July and the end of November. He was ordered to the Hydrographic Office, Bureau of Navigation, in Washington, DC. There he annotated the photographs he had taken during his trip to Alaska the year before. A Hydrographic Office memo reads: "These items are all brief, and some are unimportant, but in the aggregate they represent a very definite contribution." The memo adds that Hubbard's information would be used in the 1942 update of the Sailing Directions for British Columbia, section 175, and possibly in section 176. On October 6, he was "honorably released from temporary active duty."

Hubbard was next called to active duty at the end of November, two weeks before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

In 1984, Captain Thomas Moulton testified in court as a witness for the Scientologists. Moulton had served briefly with Hubbard, and expressed a deep admiration for him. Moulton recounted another of Hubbard's claims of military prowess that the Scientologists probably had not expected.

According to Moulton, on the day the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Hubbard "had been landed, so he told me, in Java from a destroyer named the Edsall [misspelled "Edsel" in the Court transcript] and had made his way across the land to Surabaja .... When the Japanese came in, he took off into the hills and lived up in the jungle for some time .... He was, as far as I know, the only person that ever got off the Edsall ....She was sunk within a few days after that." Hubbard had allegedly been a gunnery officer on the Edsall.

Hubbard also told Moulton that he had been hit by machine-gun fire, "in the back, in the area of the kidneys .... He told me he made his escape eventually to Australia .... He and another chap sailed a liferaft... to West Australia where they were picked up by a British or Australian destroyer... on the order of seventy-five miles off Australia .... It was a remarkable piece of navigation." Sailing over 700 miles in a life-raft is remarkable indeed.

In fact, Hubbard's naval record shows no time on Java. He had been ordered to active duty on November 24, 1941, and, on the day Pearl Harbor was attacked, Hubbard was half a world away from Java in New York. Eight days after his supposed landing in Java, Hubbard was receiving instruction at the District Intelligence Office, in San Francisco. Hubbard was en route to the Philippines when the ship's destination was changed to Australia. Hubbard left the ship in Brisbane on January 11. Japanese action against Java began at the end of February. The USS Edsall was sunk at the beginning of March (long after Pearl Harbor), and Java surrendered to the Japanese on March 9. On the same day, Hubbard in fact boarded the MV Pennant, in Brisbane, Australia, bound for the United States.

When Hubbard arrived in Brisbane in January 1942, he seems to have informally attached himself to a newly landed U.S. Army Unit. Within a few weeks, he was in trouble with his Navy superiors. There had been a mix-up over the routing of a ship, and a copy of a secret dispatch had gone astray. While Hubbard may not have been to blame, he took the undiplomatic course of writing a report about the incident which was openly hostile of his senior officers, including the U.S. Naval Attaché.

The Scientologists offer a document written by Infantry Colonel Alexander Johnson to the Commander of the Base Force, Darwin, Australia, dated February 13, 1942. The document describes Hubbard as "an intelligent, resourceful and dependable officer." The following day the U.S. Naval Attaché to Australia expressed a very different point of view: "By assuming unauthorized authority and attempting to perform duties for which he has no qualifications, he became the source of much trouble. This, however, was made possible by the representative of the U.S. Army at Brisbane .... This officer is not satisfactory for independent duty assignment. He is garrulous and tries to give impressions of his importance. He also seems to think that he has unusual ability in most lines. These characteristics indicate that he will require close supervision for satisfactory performance of any intelligence duty." Far from being an important intelligence operative, as the Scientologists fondly believe, Hubbard was simply a nuisance. So much so that after only a month in Australia, orders were prepared for Hubbard's return to the United States.

Twenty years later, Hubbard described his brief time in Australia: "My acquaintance ... goes back to being the only anti-aircraft battery in Australia in 1941-42. I was up at Brisbane. There was me and a Thompson sub-machine gun .... I was a mail officer and I was replaced,I think, by a Captain, a couple of commanders . . . and about 15 junior officers .... They replaced me. I came home." He made no mention of his supposed adventures on Java. 1

A Scientology press release claims that Hubbard was "flown home in the late spring of 1942 in the Secretary of the Navy's private plane as the first U.S. returned casualty from the Far East." Another Scientology account adds that Hubbard "was relieved by fifteen officers of rank [no longer "junior officers"] and was rushed home to take part in the 1942 battle against German submarines as Commanding Officer of a Corvette serving in the North Atlantic." Yet another Scientology account says he "rose to command a squadron."

In reality, after his return by ship to San Francisco at the end of March 1942, Hubbard was hospitalized for catarrhal fever, which he had contracted aboard ship. Being the "first U.S. returned casualty from the Far East" seems to have consisted of having a bad cold. A doctor noted that he was "somewhat preoccupied with himself." Upon recovering from his cold, Hubbard was posted to intelligence duties at Naval Headquarters in San Francisco. He immediately requested transfer to New York. After two weeks, he was sent to the Office of the Cable Censor in New York. A dispatch written in April says: "The Chief Cable Censor is cognizant of the letter from the Naval Attaché, Australia, dated February 14, 1942, and has considered the suggestion made therein. It is therefore recommended that no disciplinary action be taken."

In New York, Hubbard went on the sick list almost immediately, suffering from conjunctivitis for a few days.

During World War II, junior U.S. Naval Officers were promoted in batches, and in June, Hubbard became a Lieutenant senior grade. This was the highest rank he achieved, which was unusual, as he continued in active service for more than three years beyond this date. When Hubbard was transferred to New York, cable censorship had just ceased to be a function of Intelligence, so Hubbard ceased to be an "intelligence officer." His designation for work in Intelligence was amended to that of a Deck Officer. He requested sea duty in the Caribbean, but was posted to Neponset, Massachusetts, a suburb of Boston, at the end of June 1942. There he was to oversee the conversion of a trawler, the MV Mist, into a Navy yard patrol craft, the USS YP-422.

A Scientology press release says that the Mist, under Hubbard's command, served with British and American anti-submarine warfare vessels in the North Atlantic. The truth is less heroic. The Mist, or YP-422, put to sea from the Boston Navy Yard on training exercises in August. The exercises lasted twenty-seven hours, in which time YP-422 fired a few practice rounds, but it saw no action against the enemy under Hubbard's command. Once again Hubbard managed to antagonize his superiors. In a dispatch to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Boston Navy Yard wrote: "Lt. L.R. Hubbard is in command of YP 422 completing conversion and fitting out at Boston, in the opinion of the Commandant he is not temperamentally fitted for independent command. It is therefore urgently requested that he be detached and that order for relief be expedited in view of the expected early departure of the vessel. Believe Hubbard capable of useful service if ordered to other duty under immediate supervision of a more senior officer."

On October 1, Hubbard was summarily detached from the YP-422 and ordered to New York. So ended his only command in the Atlantic. Although his record shows no service in the eastern Atlantic, a photograph shows Hubbard wearing the "European and African campaign" ribbon nonetheless. The Scientology tale, doubtless inspired if not written by Hubbard, about his command of a squadron pursuing German submarines is entirely fanciful.

Back in New York, Hubbard wrote to the Bank of Alaska, who had finally caught up with him, explaining that he could not repay the $265 he had borrowed during his 1940 "expedition." This is only one of a number of unpaid debts recorded in his Navy file.

Hubbard again requested sea duty in the Caribbean, but in November 1942 was ordered to the Submarine Chaser Center, in Florida, for training. In a lecture given in 1964, Hubbard talked about his time there: "Fortunately, it was a lovely, lovely warm classroom, and I was shipped for a very short time down into the south of Florida... and, boy was I able to catch up on some sleep." 2

A Scientology publication claims that in 1943 Hubbard became a Commodore of Corvette Squadrons. Whatever else he was, Hubbard was certainly never a Commodore (the rank between Captain and Rear Admiral) in the U.S. Navy; at least until he appointed himself to that rank in his Sea Org, nearly twenty-five years later.

After two months in the warm classrooms of Florida, Hubbard was posted, on January 17, 1943, to the Albina shipyards, in Portland, Oregon. There he was to assist with the fitting out of the PC 815, and to assume command when she was commissioned. The PC 815 was a patrol craft, a "sleek hulled submarine chaser of approximately 280 tons full load," according to Jane's Fighting Ships.

Hubbard asked Thomas Moulton, with whom he had studied in Florida, to become his executive officer when the PC 815 was commissioned. Moulton was posted to Portland in March 1943. He arrived to find Hubbard recovering from another bout of catarrhal fever in the care of his wife, Polly.

Hubbard's eyes troubled him and he wore dark glasses constantly. At a dance at the Seattle Tennis Club, he took off the glasses, and Moulton says Hubbard's eyes reddened and began to water in a matter of minutes. He told Moulton his difficulty was due to the "flash from a large caliber gun . . . on a destroyer he had been on." During a medical examination in 1946, Hubbard attributed his visual trouble to "excessive tropical sunlight." The real problem was a recurrence of his conjunctivitis.

Moulton added: "he frequently complained of pain in his right side and the back in the area of the kidneys which he said was due to some damage from a Japanese machine gun .... And from that he had considerable difficulty in urination. And upon at least one occasion I saw him urinating bloody urine."

Attorney Michael Flynn later suggested that Hubbard's difficulty might well have been a "social disease," allegedly mentioned in Hubbard's private papers. Bloody urine can result from an excess of sulfa drugs, commonly used at that time as a treatment for venereal disease. Hubbard later complained about the amount of sulfa drugs he had been fed in the Navy.

When the USS PC 815 was commissioned on April 21, Hubbard became her Commanding Officer. The next day, a remarkable article was printed in the Oregon Journal. The text is headed with a picture of Hubbard, in dark glasses, and Moulton, and reads in part:

Lieutenant Commander Ron ("Red") Hubbard, former Portlander, veteran sub hunter of the battles of the Pacific and Atlantic has been given a birthday present for Herr Hitler by Albina Hellshipyard . . .

Hubbard is an active member of the Explorers club, New York city. He has commanded three internationally important expeditions for that organization. In 1934 Hubbard had charge of the Caribbean Motion Picture Expedition and took the first underwater films. He was the first to use the now famous bathosphere [sic] or diving ball [sic!, read "bell"] for this work. In 1935 Hubbard headed a cartographic survey in West Indian waters and in 1939 and 1940, for the navy hydrographic office, led the noted Alaska Radio Experimental Expedition.

Hubbard comes from a long line of naval men: His father is Lieutenant H.R. Hubbard; his grandfather, Captain Lafayette Waterbury; his great grandfather, Captain I. C. De Wolfe, all of whom helped to make American naval history.

We are then told that Hubbard spent his youth in Portland, and are given his statement about the "Albina Hellships": "Those little sweethearts are tough. They could lick the pants off anything Nelson or Farragut ever sailed. They put up a sizzling fight and are the only answer to the submarine menace. I state emphatically that the future of America rests with just such escort vessels."

In the Journal, Hubbard has been promoted and his father demoted. There is no mention elsewhere of "Captain" Waterbury's naval career, and "I. C. De Wolfe" was the maiden name of Hubbard's maternal grandmother, Ida Corinne. As usual the story was tailored to fit the circumstances, Hubbard had cut his cloth to fit a man of greater stature than himself.

In mid-May 1943, the newly refitted USS PC 815 sailed from Astoria, on the Oregon coast, into the Pacific on a "shake-down" cruise. Her destination was San Diego. Shortly after leaving Astoria, sonar readings indicated the presence of a submarine; at least according to Hubbard and Moulton in the Action Report they filed at the time.

Strangely enough, Hubbard does not seem to have recounted this story to his followers. Despite many remarkable tales about his naval career, this was the only action which even approached a "battle" in which he took part.

Hubbard's report runs to eighteen typewritten pages. It was written two days after the PC 815 had returned to Astoria, facing general disbelief, as Hubbard admitted, so he backed up his report with several others from the crew.

Admiral Fletcher, Commander Northwest Sea Frontier who reviewed Hubbard's report found it was "not in accordance with 'Anti-Submarine Action by Surface Ship.' " Fletcher had a point: the action report reads strangely like a short story.

The "battle" took place off Cape Lookout, some fifty miles south of the mouth of the Columbia River. The PC 815 was in the steamer track, ten or twelve miles off the Oregon coast. After an echo contact had been checked, the PC 815 laid three depth charges, just before 4:00 a.m., on May 19.

Shortly before 5:00 a.m., Hubbard gave orders to fire on an object that had appeared in the early morning light. In his report he admitted that it was probably a large piece of driftwood, but justified the attack as a means of checking the PC 815's guns.

In the first hour, the PC 815 made three runs, using nine depth charges. Hubbard had to be more sparing with the remaining three, which were laid one at a time on three successive runs. Hubbard said that his object was to force the submarine to come up, so it could be attacked with the guns.

The PC 815 was joined by two anti-submarine "blimps" (non-rigid airships) at nine that morning, by which time she had no charges left. The submarine had failed to respond in any way to these attacks. By midday, eight hours into the battle, Hubbard had decided that the submarine could not fire torpedoes. The PC 815 would have provided an easy target, as, according to Hubbard, the sea was calm (Moulton later contradicted this, saying the sea was sometimes "quite rough").

Hubbard complained that his requests for more depth charges were acknowledged but not answered. For at least four hours, the PC 815, which had no depth charges, kept the purported submarine in place. No oil or debris from the submarine had been sighted, so there was no indication of damage. The submarine made no attempt to retaliate or escape. The PC 815 was joined in the afternoon by the SC 536 (SCs, or Sub Chasers, were slightly smaller vessels than the PC 815). The SC 536 seems to have had inadequate detection equipment, so had to follow the PC 815 over the target, and lay her depth charges at the signal of a whistle. In his report Hubbard praised the lieutenant commanding the SC 536 to the skies.

Later that afternoon the PC 815's soundman found a second submarine. Hubbard said the blimps saw air bubbles, oil and a periscope. The blimps' own reports do not seem to have mentioned this. Throughout the "battle" several oil boils appeared, but the PC 815 failed to take samples.

The SC 536 had made three attacks by 4:36 p.m., when a Coast Guard patrol boat delivered twenty-three new depth charges to the PC 815. That evening, the USS CG Bonham and the SC 537 arrived. They could not locate a submarine with their detection equipment. Hubbard castigated them for their lack of co-operation, suggesting that the commander of the Bonham was afraid he would damage his ship if he fired a depth charge.

On the second day, the "battle" continued at a slower pace. Hubbard was officially given command of the assembly that afternoon. On the third day of this one-sided contest, a periscope was allegedly sighted, but rapidly disappeared when the PC 815's gunners opened fire.

They were joined by the larger PC 778, which carried fifty depth charges. She found no indication of submarines, so refused either to lay depth charges, or to supply any to Hubbard. Indeed, Hubbard had such difficulty obtaining more ammunition that Moulton sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in Pearl Harbor, "asking why in thunder we couldn't get any help."

At midnight, on May 21, the PC 815 was ordered back to Astoria. According to Hubbard's report, the action had lasted for 55 hours, 27 minutes. The PC 815 had remained in the area searching for a further thirteen hours. They had used a total of thirty-five depth charges, and despite the failure of either of the submarines to respond, they had sustained three minor casualties and shot away their own radio antenna.

In a personnel report attached to his Action Report, Hubbard congratulated his crew without exception for their part in the "battle."

In his summary, Hubbard again sang the praises of Lieutenant Kroepke of the SC 536. He criticized the commanding officers of the blimps for their lack of knowledge of anti-submarine warfare.

Hubbard concluded his report with the claim that the PC 815 had completely immobilized one Japanese submarine, and severely damaged a second.

Another officer, Ensign Walker, mentioned only one submarine in his report. Moulton confirmed Hubbard's report, both at the time and forty years later in court. Admiral Fletcher was not impressed. In his comment on the report of June 8, 1943, he said:

SC's 536 and 537, CGC's BONHAM and 78302, and blimps K-33 and K-39 engaged in this submarine search. Reports have been received from the Commanding Officer of each of these ships in writing and in personal interviews. An oral report has also been received from Lieutenant Commander E.J. Sullivan, U.S.N., Commander Airship Squadron 33, who made a trip to the area during the search on one of the blimps .... There is a known magnetic deposit in the area in which depth charges were dropped ....

An analysis of all reports convinces me that there was no submarine in the area. Lieutenant Commander Sullivan states that he was unable to obtain any evidence of a submarine except one bubble of air which is unexplained except by turbulence of water due to a depth charge explosion. The Commanding Officers of all ships except the PC 815 state they had no evidence of a submarine and do not think a submarine was in the area.

It seems that at the time Hubbard managed to win his crew over into believing they had disabled two submarines. They certainly believed in him. One of the reports submitted by the crew included this statement: "But above all the crew, each and every man looks up to and respects the captain, L. Ron Hubbard and everything in every way that the men should respect a leader [sic]. And I might add that the crew thinks that he is one of the best leaders of any ship afloat." And in court Moulton said of Hubbard: "He ran a very competent, extremely competent attack throughout the thing. He did a very fine job."

Hubbard's report, written before Admiral Fletcher had interviewed anyone, was defensive from the start. His statements about those who disagreed with him are interesting: he criticized the very officers who were to deny the submarines' existence. For someone who claimed to have slept during his only course in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and had not seen action previously, Hubbard's comments about the other commanders' inadequate knowledge of ASW were distinctly high-handed.

On June 28, the PC 815 put to sea once more for training exercises. At Hubbard's order, she fired three practice rounds from her three-inch gun in the direction of Los Coronados islands. Hubbard had anchored in Mexican waters, and the islands were Mexican territory. Within two days a Board of Investigation was underway. On July 7 a fitness report on Hubbard was written by Rear Admiral Braisted, Commander Fleet Operational Training Command, Pacific. In the "Remarks" section, the Rear Admiral said: "Consider this officer lacking in the essential qualities of judgment, leadership and cooperation. He acts without forethought as to probable results. He is believed to have been sincere in his efforts to make his ship efficient and ready. Not considered qualified for command or promotion at this time. Recommend duty on a large vessel where he can be properly supervised."

As we have seen, this observation about Hubbard's need for supervision had been made by the U.S. Naval Attaché in Australia and by the Commandant of the Boston Navy Yard. This time it was heeded, and Hubbard did not receive another command.

On July 15, 1943, Rear Admiral Braisted wrote a "letter of admonition" to Hubbard and for the record. On the same day, Hubbard complained of epigastric pain and was put on the sick list in San Diego. In his private papers, Hubbard later admitted that his illness was a way of avoiding discipline. 3 He was under observation for nine days for malaria, which he claimed to have suffered from sixteen months before, in a "combat area," according to a doctor's report of Hubbard's statement at the time. Malaria was not diagnosed at this time, nor does diagnosis of malaria appear anywhere in Hubbard's extensive Navy and Veterans Administration medical files, despite his repeated complaints that he was suffering from the symptoms.

Hubbard was on the sick list for a total of seventy-seven days, suffering, it was finally decided, from a duodenal ulcer. At the end of this period, in October 1943, he asked to be ordered to landing vessels, attaching a list of his qualifications to the request which included the command of three expeditions, and a puffed-up account of his brief spell with the Marine Reserve at George Washington University. He also attached a statement seeking to justify the shelling of the Coronados, saying that most of the crew of the PC 815 had asked to return to his command. He claimed to have been given permission to fire at his own discretion, and complained that other vessels had not been censured for anchoring off the Coronados. Hubbard added, pathetically, that although he knew that he was in the grip of a throat infection at the time, this could not excuse his error.

Hubbard's statement failed to impress. Following the PC 815 fiasco, it was a year before he put to sea again. In early December 1943, Hubbard was assigned to fitting out and training the crew of the USS Algol, in Portland. In July 1944, when the Algol was commissioned, Hubbard was posted as the "Navigation and Training Officer" aboard the ship, an Attack Cargo Auxiliary Vessel. The Algol followed the same initial route as the PC 815, south from Portland, but docked at Oakland after training exercises. On Wednesday, September 27, at 4:30 p.m., the Deck Log of the Algol shows that the "navigating officer reported to the OOD [Officer on the Deck] that an attempt at sabotage had been made sometime between 1530-1600. A Coke bottle filled with gasoline with a cloth wick inserted had been concealed among cargo which was to be hoisted aboard and stored in No. 1 hold." The log is signed by the navigating officer, L. Ron Hubbard. The FBI and Navy Intelligence were called in to investigate.

The next day's log records a dispatch received at 10:14 on the night of the incident, confirming earlier orders for Hubbard to leave ship. The Algol put to sea six days later. It was to play a part in the Okinawa invasion, and by the end of the war had won two battle stars. Hubbard remained safe ashore. He later claimed that the title role in "Mr. Roberts" was based on his experiences aboard the USS Algol, with Hubbard's part taken by Henry Fonda. His Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Axton T. Jones (upon whom Hubbard was later to claim the vicious James Cagney character was based), did give Hubbard a generally favorable Fitness Report, but remarked: "Lieutenant Hubbard is a capable and energetic officer, but is very temperamental and often has his feelings hurt. He is an above average navigator and is to be trusted. This officer is of excellent personal and military character. Recommended for promotion when due."

Hubbard responded to a general Navy request for applicants "for intensive training with eventual assignment to foreign duty as civil affairs officers in occupied areas." Commander Jones had earlier approved Hubbard's request for appointment to the School of Military Government. In his application, Hubbard had claimed that he was a trained civil engineer with a knowledge of Spanish, Japanese, Pekin and Shanghai Pidgin, Tagalog and Chamorro. He had also claimed an understanding of the social psychology of the peoples of the Philippines, North China and Japan. Hubbard was one of hundreds of officers who did a three month course in "Military Government" at Princeton. However, his later claims to have studied at Princeton University are misleading. During the war the U.S. Navy had a training establishment on the campus at Princeton, which was not part of the University.

It seems likely that Hubbard was in training for the anticipated postwar occupation of Japan. By his own admission, he failed the examination for overseas posting and became depressed as a consequence. 4 In April 1945, Hubbard's duodenal ulcer flared up, and he spent the next seven months on the sick-list, largely as a patient in Oak Knoll Hospital, Oakland, California.


Additional sources: Hubbard naval record; Hubbard Veterans Administration file; Thomas Moulton testimony in GA 22; U.S.S. PC-815 Action Report; Auditor 63; A Brief Biography of L. Ron Hubbard (originally printed circa 1960, [Scientology] Public Relations Office News, Los Angeles) Donvart, Conflict of Duty, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1983; Hubbard's service in Australia was with Base Section No. 3, Brisbane - see U.S Army in World War II - The Technical Services vols. The Ordnance Dept. and The Corps of Engineers, pp. 114-115; Hubbard, Mission into Time (American St Hill Organization, 1973); Flag Divisional Directive 69RA, ""Facts About L. Ron Hubbard Things You Should Know," 8 March 1974, revised 7 April 1974; FSM magazine 1; A Report to Members of Parliament on Scientology (Worldwide PR Bureau, Church of Scientology, 1968)

1. Hubbard 1963 interview.

2. Hubbard lecture "Study: Evaluation of Information," 11 August 1964 (Study tape 5).

3. Vol. 12, p. 1925 of transcript of Church of Scientology of California vs. Gerald Armstrong, Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, case no. C 420153.

4. Hubbard, Professional Auditors Bulletin 124, 15 Nov 1957.

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